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State

v.

Chauvin: Determining the Admissibility of a Post

Traumatic

Stress

Syndrome

Diagnosis

as

Substantive

Evidence of Sexual Abuse
T hirty-four-year-old

John

Amos

Chauvin

(Chauvin)

was

accused of sexually molesting his fiancee's niece and her niece's
friend in June of 1999.1 Fifteen year-old A .C.2 testified t hat she was
visiting her friend A.L.'s home on Father's Day when Chauvin
sexually molested her.3 Fourteen-year-old A.L. claimed that later that
same day Chauvin put his tongue in her mouth when kissing her
goodbye.4 The alleged incidents were reported four days later to the
Terrebonne Parish Sheriff's Department by A.C. 's older sister, in
whom the two girls confided.5

Chauvin was later convicted in

Louisiana District Court for the Parish of Terrebonne on two counts of
indecent behavior withjuveniles.6
At the trial, the State sought to introduce the testimony of a
clinical social worker who had treated one of the girls for Post
Traumatic Stress Syndrome (PTSD).1

Because the social worker's

expert opinion indicated that A.C. 's PTSD symptoms were consistent
with those of a sexual abuse victim, the State introduced the
testimony as substantive evidence that A.C. had in fact been sexually
abused.8 Despite the defendant's objection, the trial court allowed the
State to introduce the social worker's testimony without holding a
hearing to de termine whether the expert's testimony was scientifically
reliable,

and

thus

admissible,

under

Daubert

v.

Merrell Dow

Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Finding that the trial court had erroneously
failed to hold a Daubert hearing, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of
9

Appeal reversed the convictions and remanded the matter for a new
trial.10

The Supreme Court of Louisiana held that an e xpert's

State v. C hauvin, 846 So. 2d 697, 698-99 (La. 2003).
The Louisiana Supreme Court Rules require the identification of the victims by
their initials for the protection of their anonymity. Id at 698 n.3 (citing La. Sup. Ct. Rule
XXXII § 3).
l.

2.

3.
4.
5.

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Id. at 699.
Id
Id
Id at
Id at

700.
699.

Id
Id
Id at

700.
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diagnosis of PTSD, when used to prove that sexual ab use has
occurred, is not scientifically reliable under Daubert, and therefore is
inadmissible. State v. Chauvin, 846 So. 2d 697, 709 (La. 2003).
The admissibility of expert testimony in Louisiana courts is
governed by article 702 of the Louisiana Code of Evidence, which is
substantially similar to its federal correlate, Federal Rule of Evidence
702.11 In Daubert, the United States Supreme Court held that Federal
Rule of Evidence 702 requires the trial court to "ensure that any and
all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but
reliable."12 The Daubert Court set forth four "general obse rvations"
that the trial court should make when determining whether scientific
testimony is sufficiently reliable, including:

( 1) whether the theory
has been published or subjected to peer review, (2) the theory's error
rate, (3) the testability of the theory, and ( 4) whether the theory is
generally accepted in the scientific community.1.i

Daubert also

counsels trial judges to attend to other evidentiary

rules when

deciding the admissibility of expert testimony.14 Specifically, Daubert
requires that the trial judge apply Federal Rule of Evidence 403 to
determine whether

the probative value

of expert testimony is

outweighed by "the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury."15

11.

State v. Foret, 628 So. 2d 1116, 1121 (La. 1993). Rule 702 provides:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto
in the fonn of an opinion or othetwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient
facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods,
and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of
the case.
FED. R. Evm. 702. Louisiana's corresponding rule reads:

"If scientific, technical, or other

specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to detennine a
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or othetwise." LA. CODE Evm. ANN.
art. 702 (West 2004).

12.

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S . 579, 589 (1993).

Prior to the

Court's ruling in Daubert, the test for the admissibility of expert testimony under Federal Rule
of Evidence 702 required " general acceptance" among the scientific community of the
scientific technique at issue. Foret, 628 So. 2d at 1122-23.

Foret, 628 So. 2 d at 1122 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94).
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 59 5.
Id (quoting
R. Evm. 403). Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides in full,
"Alth�ugh relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially
outwe1ghe by e danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,
or by cons1derat10ns of undue delay, waste of time, or n eedless presentation of cumulative
.
evidence." FED. R. Evm. 403.
13.
14.
15.

�ED.

�

�
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Foret, the Louisiana Supreme Court adopted the

Daubert ruling, holding that scientific evidence must "rise to a
threshold level of reliability" to be admissible under article

702 of the

Louisiana Code of Evidence.16 In addition, the Foret court embraced
the "observations" that Daubert provided.11
noted that State

v.

The Foret court also

Catanese, a prior Louisiana decision, requires the

use of a balancing test that weighs the probative value of scientific
evidence against its potential for prejudice and confusion of the
issues.
•

18

PTSD generally satisfies the Daubert admissibility standard
because it is testable, published, and recognized within the scientific
community.19 PTSD has been recognized by the American Psychiatric
Association as a diagnosable anxiety disorder since its introduction
into the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM-IV) in 1983.20
At least one scholar maintains that because PTSD generally
satisfies the Daubert standard, it should be admissible "whenever
mental state or injury is at issue."21

Other commentators have found

that PTSD, though generally reliable to diagnose trauma, is unreliable
when used to diagnose sexual abuse.22

These authors cite research

indicating that PTSD is too narrow a diagnosis for sexual abuse
victims, who often suffer from a greater range of symptoms than other
PTSD patients. 23 Other critics purport that PTSD symptoms are often
seen in otherwise psychologically healthy individuals, and thus are
not a reliable indicator of abnormality.24 Still another concern is that
PTSD is known to result from a variety of stressors, including, but not
limited to, sexual assault.25

16.
17.

Foret, 628 So. 2d at 1123.
Id

18.

Id at 1123 n.6; see also State v. Catanese, 368 So. 2d 975, 979-81 (La. 1979)

(holding that the probative value of polygraph evidence is outweighed by the potential for
prejudice, waste of time, and misleading the jury ).
19.
Edgar Garcia-Rill & Erica Beecher-Monas, Gatekeeping Stress: The Science and
Admissibility ofPost-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 9, 29-30
(2001).
20.

State

v.

Chauvin, 846 So. 2d 697, 704 (La. 2003) (citing I E.B. MYERS, EVIDENCE

IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES § 5.3, 423 n. 75 (3d ed. 1997) (citation omitted)).

2 1.

Garcia-Rill & Beecher-Monas, supra note 19, at I 0.

22.

Lisa R. Askowitz & Michael H. Graham, The Reliability ofExpert Psychological

Testimony in Cluld Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 2027, 204 7 ( 1994).
23.
Id
24.
Id at 2048.
25.
Jane Campbell Moriarty, Wondeis of the Invisible World·
Prosecutoda/
Syndrome and Profile Evidence in the: Salem Witchcraft Trials, 26 VT. L. REv. 43, 96 (200 I).
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One particularly complicating factor is the unclear distinction
between PTSD, Rape Trauma Syndrome (RTS), and C hild Sexual
Abuse Acconnnodation Syndrome (CSAAS).2" Many com me ntators
and courts discuss the syndromes interchangeably.21

Such overlap

may be improper, as PTSD is a diagnosable anxiety disorder resulting
from an array of traumatic stressors, while RTS and C SAAS are
merely "descriptions of behavior" that follow
events.28

spec(/ic

traumatic

Whereas PTSD has been included in the DSM-lV since

1980, the other two syndromes are not included in this reference.2'/
Also unlike PTSD, the other syndromes are insufficiently tested and
have high error rates.Jo Some connnentators arg ue that because the
syndromes are confused, PTSD testimony is often inappropriately
excluded in the courtroom.J'
The federal courts have not settled on a uniform approach to the
admissibility of a PTSD diagnosis as substantive evidence of sexual
abuse.J2 Although the United States Supreme Court has not ruled on
the ad missibility of PTSD testimony in sexual abuse cases, one
federal circuit court has held that PTSD testimony is admissible as
substantive evidence of sexual assault.33

In S.M.

v.

J.K., the United

States Court of Appeals for the Ninth C ircuit upheld the plaintiff's use

26.

Arthur H. Garrison, Rape Trauma Syndrome: A Review ofa Behavioral Science

Theory and Its Admissibility in Criminal Tna!s, 23

AM.

J. TRIAL ADVOC. 591, 6 40 (2000).

Rape Trauma Syndrome describes the specific traumatic reactions suffered by rape victims.

Id at 601. Similarly, Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome seeks to "provide a
'common language"' to describe the specific reactions that a child has to sexual abuse.

Askowitz, supra note 22, at 2038 (citing Ronald C. S ununit, The Child Sexual Abuse

Accommodation Syndrome, 7 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 177' 186 -87(1983 )).
27.

Garrison, supra note 26, at

640;

see, e.g., Hutton v. State, 663 A.2d 1289, 1294

(Md. l 995) ("PTSD is sometimes defined in terms of the stressor

which caused it.

Accordingly, when the stressor is rape, the term "rape trauma syndrome . . . is sometimes
used.")
28.

Garrison, supra note 26, at 640.

29.
30.

Garcia-Rill & Beecher-Monas, supra note 19, at 30.
Id

�

31.
Id at 31 citing Sue Osthoff, Preface to Janet Parrish, Trend Analysis: Expert
.
Testimony on Battenng and Its Effects in Criminal Cases' 11 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 75 84
(1996)).
'

32.
Because the Louisiana evidentiary rule at issue is substantially similar to its
federal correlate, both federal and other states' case l a w is applicable to its interpretation.
State v. Foret, 628 So. 2d 1116, 1121(La.1993). An examination of federal and other states'
�se law is also relevant, as the question of admissibility raised in Chauvin is one of first
impression in Louisiana.

S.M. v. J.K., 262 F.3d 914, 920-22 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Isely v. Capuc hin
I 055, l 067(E.D. Mich. l 995) (holding in a civil matter that an expert
witness may testify that plaintiff suffers from PTSD though
she may not testify that she
believes plaintiff was sexually abused).
33.

_
Pr:ovrnce,
877 F. � upp.
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of a PTSD diagnosis as proof that she had been sexually assaulted.34
The defendant objected to the testimony, claiming that the expert's
opinion

was

scientifically

unreliable

and

that

it

improperly

substantiated the plaintiff's credibility.35 The trial judge overruled the
defendant's objections to the testimony, finding that the objections
related to the weight of the testimony rather than to its admissibility.36
The Ninth Circuit affmned, noting that Daubert suggests that "shaky
but admissible evidence" can be appropriately attacked through cross
examination, thoughtful jury instruction, and contradictory evidence.37
Conversely, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia held in Spencer

v.

General Electric Co. that a

PTSD diagnosis cannot be introduced to prove damages resulting
from an alleged rape in a civil suit.38 The Spencer court held that the
expert's testimony usurped the jury's function of assessing the
credibility of the plaintiff.39

The court also held that the probative

value of PTSD evidence offered as proof of rape was outweighed by
its potentially prejudicial effect, finding that the expert's testimony
"constitutes an opinion as to the guilt of the defendant.'"'0
State jurisprudence is also
Although

many

state courts

shar ply divided

on

allow expert PTSD

this issue.

testimony as

substantive proof of sexual abuse, the majority of state supreme
courts have refused to allow such testimony.41 In Alberico

v.

State, a

leading case supporting the substantive use of PTSD testimony, the
Supreme Court of New Mexico unequivocally held PTSD testimony
admissible to show that an alleged victim's behavior is consistent with
sexual abuse.42 As a threshold question, the Alberico court analyzed
whether PTSD is a scientifically valid theory.43
34.
3 5.
36.
37.
(1993)).
38.

S.M, 2 62 F.3d at 920-22.
Id at 920.
Id
Id at 921-22 (citing Daubert

Spencer v. Gen. Elec.

Co.,

v.

Merrell Dow Pharms.,

Noting PTSD's

Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596

688 F. Supp. 1072, 1076-78 (E.D. Va. 1988)

(applying

the pre-Daubenadmissibility test).

39.
40.
41.

Id a t 1076-77.
Id at 1077.
Hutton v. State, 663 A.2d 1289, 1 2 95 (Md. 1995).

For cases holding that PTSD
evidence is admissible as substantiv e e v idence of sexual abuse, see State v. Albenco, 861 P.2d

192 (N.M. 1993), and State

Florczak, 882 P.2d 199 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994). To compare
PTSD diagnosis as proof that sexual abuse occurred, see
Hutton v. State, 663 A.2d 1289 (Md. 1995); Commonwealth v. Hudson, 631 N.E.2d 50
(Mass. 1994); State v. Cressy, 628 A.2d 696 (N.H. 1993); and State v. Hall, 412 S.E.2d 883
(N.C. 1992).
42. 861 P.2d at 213-14.
43. Id at 2 06.
v.

cases refusing to allow evidence of a
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g ro unded in

"

basic behavioral psychology," the court determ ined that PTSD is, in
fact, scientifically reliable.44 Next, the court discussed whether PTSD

evidence is probative, that is, it "reliably and accurately proves what it
purports to prove" and will "assist the trier of fact.'..i1 The court found

that because a person diagnosed with PTSD might have suffered
sexual abuse, PTSD "has a tendency to p rove" sexual abuse.4''

Finally, the court ultimately determined that the potential prejudice

associated with the PTSD diagnosis does not outweigh its probative
value, despite the fact that the diagnosis is often based on the victim's
own reports of abuse; the court held that effective cross-examination

eliminates any prejudice caused by the clinician's reliance on the
victim.47

Conversely, in Hutton

v.

State, Maryland's highest court held that

PTSD testimony is inadmissible when introduced to show that an
alleged victim's behavior is consistent with sexual abuse.4·'

After

reviewing the jurisprudence of several states, the Hutton court found
that PTSD was inadmissible as substantive proof of sexual abuse

because it is scientifically unreliable and m isleading to the jury.49 The

court observed that the first criterion of a PTSD diagnosis is the actual
occurrence of a traumatic stressor.50

In determining whether a

traumatic stressor has occurred, the diagnosing clinician often relies

on the victim's own report.51 Thus, when the existence of a stressor
has not yet been definitively established, the existence of the stressor,
and thus the veracity of the victim, must be assumed by the clinician.52

As a result, the court found that PTSD is not a scientifically reliable
means of proving that sexual abuse is the cause of an alleged victim's
symptoms.53 The court held that expert testimony th a t necessarily
relies on the credibility of the victim usurps the jury's function to
44. Id at 208-09. The court's finding of reliability was also bolstered by the e xperts'
.
testimony that they could detennine the specific cause o f the disorder by a patient's specific
PTSD symptoms. Idat 209.
45 .

Id at 206.

4?.
Id at 20�. The court also took into consideration th e experts' claim that they
could, m fact, detenmne the specific cause of the victim's PTSD. Jd

47.
48.
49.
50 .

Idat 210.

Hutton

v.

State, 663 A.2d 1289, 1301 (Md. 1995).

Id at 1295, 1300.

Id at 1299. Criteria� A of the diagnostic criteria begins
by stating, "The person
has been exposed to a traumatic event. . .." AM. PSYCHIATRJ
C Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANuAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 427 (4th ed. 1994).

Hutton, 663 A.2d at

51.
52.

Idat 1295.

53.

Id

1300.
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independently determine the victim's credibility.54
held that

expert testimony that

1749
Thus, the court

a victim's PTSD

consistent with sexual abuse is inadmissible.55

diagnosis is

The court also held,

however, that a diagnosis of PTSD is admissible when introduced to
explain why an alleged victim's behavior is apparently inconsistent
with the claim of sexual abuse.56
In the noted case, the Louisiana Supreme Court reviewed both
scholarly opinion and case law before embracing the Maryland
court's reasoning in Hutton and holding that PTSD evidence is
inadmissible when introduced as substantive proof of sexual abuse.57
Also relying on Hutton, the

Chauvin court opined that PTSD

evidence should be admissible only when offered for the purpose of
explaining the behavior of a sexual abuse victim.58
The court looked first to academic literature discussing the use
of PTSD evidence in sexual abuse cases.59

The court began its

discussion by noting the competing policy concerns at stake in child
sexual abuse cases:

the concern that child sexual abuse cases are

difficult by n ature to try must be balanced against the fact that expert
testimony may be unduly prejudicial to the accused.60 The court then
discussed the manner in which the academic community views the
scientific reliability and consequent admissibility of PTSD evidence.61
The court concluded that PTSD is sufficiently well established in the
scientific community to generally be an acceptable topic of expert
testimony,62 but further determined that because PTSD may be caused
by psychological stressors other than sexual abuse, it is merely a

54.

Id at 1300.

55.

Id at 1301.

Id Children who are sexually abused often hesitate to report their experience to
adults. John E.B. Myers et al., Expert Testimony in Child SexualAbuse Litigation, 68 NEB.
56.

L. REv. 1, 86-87 (1989). Once a child does report abuse, the account may be inaccurate as a

result of the child's insecurity and embarrassment. Id at 87. Expert testimony has often been
allowed to explain that such behavior is not necessarily inconsistent with sexual abuse. See
People v. Taylor, 552 N.E.2d 131, 137 (1990) (collecting case law allowing expert testimony
to explain victim behavior).
57.

State v. Chauvin, 846 So. 2d 697, 709 (La. 2003).

58.

Id

59.

Id at 702-04.
Id at 702-03 (citing Dara Loren Steele, Note, Expert Testimony- Seeking an

60.

Appropdate Admissibility Standard for
Prosecutions, 48
61.
62.

Behavioral Science

in

Child Sexual Abuse

DUKEL.J. 933, 938 (1999)).

Chauvin, 846 So. 2d at 703-04.
Id at 704. T he court did not provide any reasoning for this conclusion other than

a recitation o f the diagnostic criteria of the disorder provided in the

fourth edition of the

American P s ychiatric Associat ion's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual ofMental Disorders.

[Vol. 78: 1743
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"therapeutic tool," not intended to specifically identify instances of
sexual abuse.63
Turning to an overview of relevant case law, the court noted
cursorily that Louisiana appellate courts have repeatedly held PTSD
evidence to be admissible in various capacities other than su bstantive
proof of sexual abuse.64 Reviewing other states' law, the court found
that although most states allow PTSD testimony to be introduced to
explain the unusual behavior of a sexual abuse victim, many do not
allow PTSD evidence to be introduced as substantive proof of sexual
abuse.65

Finally, the court quoted extensively from the Maryland

Supreme Court's decision in Hutton, discussed above.''''
After a review of relevant authority, the co urt provided two
concerns underlying its holding.67 First, the Louisiana Supreme Court
reasoned that because psychological stressors besides sexual abuse
may cause PTSD, expert testimony regarding PTSD does not reliably
prove the fact of abuse.68 The court noted that the DSM-IV itself
cautions "[n]onclincial decision makers" that a diagnosis of PTSD
does not necessarily identify the cause of the diagnosis.1'9 Secondly,
the court

expressed concern that

such scientifically

unreliable

testimony would unduly prejudice the jury, who would consider this
testimony from an expert to be a "medical conclusion.

"10

Finally, the court referred to its decision in State v. Foret, in
which it held that CSAAS testimony was not scientifically valid
under Daubert when used as substantive evidence of sexual abuse.11
The court reasoned that because the diagnosis of PTSD is a broader,
more universal diagnosis than CSAAS, it can be no more reliable for
evidentiary purposes than a CSAAS diagnosis. 72 The court thus
placed the same evidentiary constraints on PTSD in Chauvin as it

63.

Id (citingAskowitz&Graham, supra note 22, at 2046).
Id at 704-05 (citing G.N.S. v. S.B.S., 796 So. 2d 739 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2001);
State ex rel B.J., 767 So. 2d 869 (La. Ct. App. 1 st Cir. 2000);
State v. Adkins, 721 So. 2d
1090 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1998); State v. Bosley, 691
So. 2d 347 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1997);
Held v. State F ann Ins. Co., 610 So. 2d 1017 (La. C
t. App. !st Cir. 1992)). The admissibility
_
of PTSD testunon
y as substantiv e proof of sexual abuse is a novel issue in Louisiana.
Id at 705.
65.

64.

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id at 706-07 (citing Hutton v. State, 663 A.2d
1289, 1294-95 (Md. 1995)).
Id at 707.
Id

%. (quoting

AM. PSYCHIATRICASS'N, supra note 50).

Id at 707-08 (citing State v. Foret 628
So. 2d 1116 1127 (La 1 993))
Id at 708.
'

'

·

·
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placed on CSAAS in Foret, limiting its admissibility to explain the
unusual behavior of a sexual abuse victim.73
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Weimer opined that the trial
court did not err in admitting the social worker's testimony that the

victim's PTSD symptoms were c onsistent with sexual abuse.74 Justice
Weimer n oted that the expert at all times observed the DSM-IV's
warning that a diagnosis of PTSD does not necessarily implicate any
specific stressor as the cause. 75

He reiterated that the expert's

testimony was limited to the observation that the victim suffered from
PTSD and that her symptoms were consistent with having been

sexually abused.76

At no time did the expert state that the alleged

sexual abuse was the cause of the PTSD symptoms the victim
exhibited.77 Thus, the dissent argued that because the expert did not
specifically testify as to the credibility of the victim, the testimony
should have been admissible.78
Although the majority correctly determined that PTSD evidence
offered as substantive evidence o f sexual abuse is inadmissible, its
analysis merely contributes to the confusion of divided opinion
surrounding this issue.

The crux of the majority's holding is its

finding that because PTSD was designed to be a "therapeutic tool,"
PTSD diagnoses are unreliable to determine whether a given patient

has suffered from sexual abuse.79

The notion that PTSD is a mere

"therapeutic tool" derives from the diagnostic criteria of PTSD listed
in the DSM-IV.80 According to the DSM-IV, the PTSD diagnosis
requires, before all else, exposure to a traumatic event.81 W hen the
traumatic event itself is in question, as is often the case in a sexual
abuse trial, any PTSD diagnosis must necessarily be based either on
an assumption that a traumatic event has occurred or o n the clinician's
reliance on the victim's word.82 Because the diagnosis, based on an
assumed stressor, purports to verify the occurrence of the s tressor, the
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id at 709.
Id (Weimer, J., dissenting).
Id (Weimer, J., dissenting).
Id (Weimer, J., dissenting).

Id (Weimer, J., dissenting).
Id (Weimer, J., dissenting).
Id at 707. The court also based its holding in its co mparison of PTSD to
CSAAS. Id at 708. However, such comparison was inappropriate in light of findings that
PTSD evidence is scientifically reliable, while other "syndrome evidence" is not. Garcia-Rill
77.

78.
79.

& Beecher-Monas, supmnote 19, at 30.
80.
See Askowitz & Graham, supra note 22, at 2046 & n.91.
81.
82.

AM. PSYCHIATRJCASS'N, supra note 50.
See Askowitz & Graham, supra note 22, at 2046 (explaining that "PTSD assumes
the presence of a stressor and then attaches a diagnosis to the c hild's reactions to it").
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argument that the diagnosis of PTSD implies the occurrence of sexual
abuse is somewhat circular.
However, the Louisiana Supreme Court incorrectly held that this
circular reasoning prevented the PTSD diagnosis from satisfying
Daubert's requirement of reliability. Daubert requires that a scientific
methodology, to be reliable, must be tested, published, generally
accepted, and low in error.83

It is virtually undisputed that the

diagnosis of PTSD satisfies all of these criteria.K4

The PTSD

diagnosis is inadmissible, not because it is unreliable, but rather
because when introduced as substantive evidence of sexual abuse, it
fails the balancing test required in federal courts by Federal Rule of
Evidence 403 and in Louisiana by State

v. Catanese.Ks
The balancing test requires that the trial judge ascertain whether
the testimony's probative value is outweighed by its potential for
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or unnecessary delay or waste of

When used as substantive evidence that sexual abuse has
occurred, PTSD has very low probative value. As discussed above, a

time.86

PTSD diagnosis often either assumes the occurrence of a traumatic
event or relies upon the credibility of the victim. In either case the
diagnosis of PTSD does little to help the jury conclude whether

sexual abuse actually occurred; in the first instance the jury must
assume the commission of a crime, and, in the second, the jury is
merely asked to believe the testimony of the victim. Some probative
value arises from the presence of the sy mptoms associated with the
diagnosis, such as nightmares, irritability, and difficulty concentrating.
These symptoms may increase the probability that some traumatic
event, possibly sexual abuse, has occurred. However, as noted above,
some research indicates that many of the symptoms of PTSD are
actually experienced by individuals who have not experienced
trauma.81 If this research is accurate, then the symptoms of PTSD
have very little tendency to prove the occurrence of any trauma,
including sexual abuse.

The modest probative value associated with a PTSD diagnosis
offered as proof of sexual abuse is severely outweighed by its
83 .

Garcia-Rill & Beecher-Monas,

84 .
85 .

Id at 30.

�ee

supra note 19, at 29.

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993) (holding
.
tha� the tnal JU�ge as ssmg
the admissibility of expert testimony must apply Federal Rule of
��
Evidence 403 m add1t1on to Federal Rule of Evidence
702); see also State v. Catanese, 3 68
So. 2� 975, 979-81 (La. 1979) (requiring that the proba
tive value of scientific evidence is not
outweighed by the potential for prejudice, waste
of time, or misleading the jury).
86 .
FED. R. Evm. 403; see also Catanese, 368
So. 2d at 979-81.
87.
SeeAskowitz & Graham, supra note 2 2, at 20
48.
.

2004]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

1753

potential for confusion of the issues and unnecessary delay or waste
of time. Although in the noted case the Louisiana Supreme Court
refused to allow PTSD testimony on the ground that it would unduly
prejudice the jury, expert testimony regarding mental health is
considered '"the least over-awing ' of the different types of expert
testimony 'because jurors have some innate knowledge of human
"'88
Thus, juror prejudice is not as serious a threat as many
behavior.
courts imagine.

Rather, the primary hazard stems from Daubert's

notion that "[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary
evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the
traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible
evidence."89 Courts that allow experts to testify that a victim suffers
from PTSD and that the symptoms of PTSD are consistent with
sexual abuse invite the defense to debunk this testimony by eliciting
from the e xpert the basis of his or her testimony.

The expert's

disclosure on cross-examination that the diagnosis is based, at the
very least, on the word of the child victim will either needlessly
confuse the jury as to the validity of the testimony, or will merely
waste

an

astute jury's time.90

The Louisiana Supreme Court correctly held that PTSD
evidence is inadmissible when offered as substantive proof of sexual
abuse.

However, it erred by basing its holding

on

the grounds that

PTSD fails to meet the Daubert standard of reliability. Instead, the
court should have conducted a Rule 403 balancing test to determine
the relative strength of the expert testimony's probative value in light
of its potential for confusion and waste of time.

Missy Thornton

88.

See id at 2096 (quoting Charles Bl eil, Evidence of Syndromes: No Need for a

"Better Mousetrap," 32 S. TEX. L.J. 37, 66 (1990)).
89 .
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596.
90.

The potential for confusion is increased when the court al lows PTSD testimony to

be introduced as substantive proof of sexual abuse but not as evidence that the victim is
telling the tr uth, as the Supreme Cou r t of New Mexico allowed in Albenco.

See State v.

Alberico, 861 P.2 d 192, 210-11 (N.M. 1993 ) (hol ding that PTSD evidenc e is inadmissible to
prove that the victim is telling the truth).

